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ABSTRACT: This essay reflects on some applications of Eero Tarasti’s existential semiotics to music 
analysis, starting from the asymmetry that marks the categories of “myself’ and “itself’. If it seems 
evident that we can know the musical being-in-itself, that is topics, norms, forms, and so on, we can 
wonder if and how we can know the being-in-myself, that is the pure kinetic energy before that it has 
token any kind of forms. As it is for Schopenhauer’s “Wille”, that firstly becomes objective as Platonic 
ideas, and secondly as spatio-temporal-causal natural realm; musical energy or “being-in-myself’ takes 
shape firstly as virtual deep-level-figures, and secondly as spatio-temporal-actorial situations, within 
which being-for-myself struggles with the being-for-itself. Modalities (will, must, can, know) operate 
in both these two levels of taking shape, but at the first level we have to look for a transcendental 
musical subject, not characterized by specific historical and cultural features. Then, I introduce the 
notion of homeostasis, that is the principle that “regulates the global process of breaking away from 
an original state of rest or balance, and of the subsequent restoration of that balance”. Homeostasis 
allows us to analyze musical modalization at a deep level, where the transcendental subject takes 
the form of the being-in-itself. But the research of a transcendental subject is slightly different to 
that of the Moi, within which the being-in-myself is situated. To analyze the being-in-myself of an 
individual musical subject, we adopt a less universal homeostasis, that is a specific way to convey 
musical energy (melodic, harmonic, rhythmic, agogic, and so on) proper of Western music. So do­
ing, I claim that one cannot recognize the first four measures of Beethoven’s Piano Sonata op. 7 as 
“the moment of Being-in-myself in all of its immediacy” as Tarasti does. Being-in-myself has to be 
examined in a different light.
KEYWORDS: Homeostasis, existential semiotics, musical analysis, modalities, transcendental subject, 
kinetic energy
Introduction
In his essay Existential and Transcendental Analysis o f Music, Tarasti 
proposes two stimulating semiotic squares, within which he applies his reconsid­
ered notions of “being” to music.1 In order to have a synthetic view, I combinate 
all Tarasti’s notions and references to different semiotic perspectives just in one
1 Eero Tarasti, “Existential and Trascendental Analysis of Music” Studi Musicali XXXIV,
2 (2005), 223-66.
square (see Diagram 1). In my reconstruction, I clearly express Tarasti’s reformula­
tion, according to which “the terms an sich [in oneself] and f ilr  sich [for oneself] 
start to means potential and actual”.2
MOI/ MYSELF-
Tarasti’s
ICH-TON
potential
being-in-myself
primary kinetic energy 
‘khora’, gestuality 
[Kristeva, Taruskin] 
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being-for-myself
musical identity 
certain kinetic forms
(can) endotactic
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topics, norms, forms 
abstract, virtual categories 
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Diagram 1. Tarasti’s notions and references to different semiotic perspectives
Some reflections
1) As first, we can remark that in Tarasti’s thought the terms pertain­
ing to the positive and the negative schemata (marked with) do not contract any 
relationships of contradiction. That is to say, “being-in-myself’ and “being-in-itself’ 
on one side, and “being-for-myself’ and “being-for-itself’ on the other one, are 
opposite and contradictory terms only in the abstract. In reality, every musical 
organism incorporates all of them, although in different proportions. Tarasti gives 
as examples the fugue — in which the Soi prevails —, and the Viennese-classical 
sonata form, the development of which “becomes the struggle place of M oi”.3 As 
Tarasti writes, “the M oi of the composer is the pure source of ideas, but we can 
also say that the transcendence lives within a man. The M oi is surrounded by the 
sphere of the Soi, the part of the ego which is social, coded, community bound
2 Ibid., 232.
3 Ibid., 238-9.
and not existential; together they form the phenomenon called the semiotic self4, 
a concept determined by the physical and virtual body”.5
2) By means of social-historical knowledges and some inferences, we can 
know the musical “being-in-itself”, that is topics, norms, forms, and so on. But 
how to know the “being-in-myself ? That is the pure kinetic energy (‘khora”, i.e. 
the archaic level of consciousness; or Kurth’s energetic-kinetic impulses of music6) 
before that it has token any kind of forms. My question is if the potential primary 
kinetic musical energy is knowable before it becomes actual in a certain form. If 
we follow Plato’s idea of Chora, the answer is negative, because he thinks that 
before the action of Demiurge the universe was just a formless chaos, or a lifeless 
spatial matter. If we go to Aristotle’s thought, the notion of the primal matter is 
only an unknowable limit concept, because in our world we can meet only already 
formed matter. In this perspective, Kristeva’s concept of “khora”, appears to us 
always as a certain level of consciousness, although archaic, and never as the pure 
unconscious. In Freudian terms, all primary processes are knowable only through 
the secondary ones. Also neonatal gestuality — although opened to take on a lot 
of different forms, depending on coming experiences — takes shape according to 
some familiar characteristics transmitted by means of DNA.
Tarasti’s analysis of Beethoven’s op. 7 
and the matter of the “khora” or “being-in-myself
Tarasti seems to suggest that it is possible to identify the “chora” with 
a certain “moment” — specified in musical time and space {principium individu- 
ationis) — of a piece. About Beethoven’s sonata op. 7, he says that “at the beginning 
of the first movement we hear only the pulsating triple rhythm and short motifs, 
which can be understood as a phase of “want-to-do” — kinetic energy as such 
without stability. That is the moment of being-in-myself in all of its immediacy”.7 
He refers here to the first four measures of the exposition. Then [bb. 5-15] “enters 
a melodic element in the upper part: the triplet pulsation continues but it is provided 
with form by this motivic idea, at which point we reach the moment of Being-for- 
myself’.8 According to this interpretation, we can notice that, from measures 1 
to 15, the piece juxtaposes two different situations internal to the Moi, or myself. 
Next appearances of two topics, those of “galloping horses” (first occurrence at 
bars 25-32) and of “chorale” (bars 59-81), represent in Tarasti’s interpretation the
4 See Thomas A. Sebeok 1979.
5 Ibid., 240.
6 Eero Tarasti, Signs o f Music. A Guide to Musical Semiotics (Berlin and New York: Mouton 
de Gruyter, 2002): 135.
7 Tarasti, “Existential”, 246.
8 Ibid.
entrance of the patriarchal order and that of the logos “with all its authority”.9 As 
he says “these topics allude to Being-for-itself. The ideal types of “galloping horse” 
rhythm or Lutheran chorale can be inferred from the texture as its Being-in-itself’.10
A circle is closed. We can notice that the order of the operations, as described 
by Tarasti, goes always from left to right within the square, first on the axis of the 
contraries, and then on the axis of the sub-contraries (both marked with). But, in 
the first case we have a passage from potential to actual states, in the second from 
actual to potential ones. Maybe, it would be better to describe these processes 
across the square by turning clockwise. This way, it would result a symmetric pas­
sage from potential to actual states, first within the Moi, and then within the Soi.
But an asymmetrical relationship, however, emerges in Tarasti’s analysis. In 
fact, while on the axis of the sub-contraries, that is the axis of the Soi, the potential 
state is represented by virtual signs (abstract topics), on the axis of the Moi, both 
potential and actual states are represented by act-signs.
It is true that Tarasti does not overgeneralize. W hen he says that “in this 
sonata the “Being-in-myself’ might be represented by the themes in their first 
occurrences”,11 he certainly means that each piece of art music has an owner, 
specific, individual organization. But, wherever the M oi does appear, the main 
problem remains if it can really appear in a certain form, that is to say in a form 
of the surface level.
A Schopenhauerian perspective
In elaborating his musical concept of “being-in-myself’, Tarasti refers 
to Kristeva’s “khora” and Fontanille’s Figures du corps. The latter distinguishes two 
kinds of body that resemble the two way by which the body is given to the knowing 
subject in Schopenhauer’s Die W elt als Wille und Vorstellung. On one side, the 
“body as such or flesh (chair), which is the center of all, the material resistance or 
impulse to semiotic processes”,12 that corresponds to Schopenhauer’s direct inner 
experience of will. On the other side, “there is a body in the proper sense which 
constitutes the identity and directional principle of the body”,13 which corresponds 
to Schopenhauer’s intuitive representation of the intellect, by which the body is 
experienced as an object among the other.
‘Body is the carrier of the “me”, Moi, whereas the proper body supports the 
“self’ or Soi”.14 This distinction resembles also Freud’s distinction between primary
9 Tarasti, forthcoming, 91.
10 Tarasti, “Existential”, 246.
11 Tarasti, forthcoming, 93.
12 Tarasti, “Existential”, 233.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
and secondary languages, the former concerning the unconscious, the latter the 
consciousness; we can approach the primary language and its “logic” only by means 
of the secondary language. In fact, as Tarasti says, “the Soi or self builds itself in 
the discursive activity. The Soi is that part of ourselves, which me, Moi, projects 
out of itself in order to create itself in its activity”,15 and so on.
But as we know, in his existential and transcendental analysis of music, Tarasti 
puts into a new form all these concepts, and we have to remark that Schopenhauer’s 
distinction between two experiences of the body corresponds to Tarasti’s distinc­
tion — both within the sphere of the Moi — between “being-in-myself’, potentiality 
without any form, and “being-for-myself”, actuality with a proper form.
Now we wonder how the “being-in-myself’ can be recognized out of the “being- 
for-myself’. Or better, if the “being-in-myself’ really stays on the same level of 
the “being-for-myself’. That means, in musical terms: it is possible to identify the 
“being-in-myself’ as a musical unit belonging to the same surface level within which 
we find the musical units recognized as “being-for-myself?” Although Tarasti’s 
analysis of Beethoven’s op. 7 was very fascinating, and the most of its results are 
analytically pertinent and significant, I think that it is not possible to identify the 
“being-in-myself’ with a certain musical unit, as Tarasti does by individuating the 
“being-in-myself’ as the first two motifs (‘a”) occurring at measures 1-4. Before 
to debate this question in technical musical terms, I want to close my comparison 
between Tarasti’s and Schopenhauer’s models. See the diagram 2.
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Diagram 2. Comparison between Tarasti’s and Schopenhauer’s models
15 Ibid., 233-4.
Close relationships come out from the scheme, which corroborate my idea 
that “being-in-myself’ can not be described in terms of space, time and causality, 
as for the Schopenhauer’s “Wille”. “Being-in-myself’ stays on a different, deeper 
level; we can only hypothesize its features, by means of hypothetical processes. 
Otherwise, by means of different kinds of inference, we can describe musical top­
ics, norms, forms as well as we do for the Ideas of all the things in the world, and 
although Ideas of the things and musical norms and forms have got only a virtual 
existence, they can operate in a normative way.
How can we approach the “being-in-myself’ 
in music?
By following Tarasti’s perspective, I’m searching for modalities and/or 
metamodalities on different levels of musical events, but without blending these 
levels. As Tarasti himself admits, one’s M oi can not directly communicate with 
other’s Moi. “M oi must first transform into Soi within one’s organism, I must 
become Me”.16 In other words, that means that we have to search for the “being- 
in-myself’ starting from the “being-in-itself’.
By the way, Schopenhauer debates the same matter when he discovers that 
we know the Will just starting from our individual will, from our body. Our will 
(Fontanille’s body, or Kristeva’s “khora”) is not the pure Will, it is always the result 
of a mediation with our objectived body (Fontanille’s proper body) by means of 
principium individuationis.
Let us start by investigating the “being-in-itself’. In this research I have to 
restrict the field, and take into account just of the Western musical tradition, be­
cause of my specific competences. But then it will be possible to extend all results 
to the music of different cultures in space and time.
Would it be possible to find any transcendental (in the Kantian sense) con­
ditions of western musical object? That is to say, a condition which — although 
limited in the space and the time of the western culture — was not depending 
from specific determinations as is the case of topics, forms, stylistic elements, 
modal/tonal/not-tonal norms, and so on? In previous works of mine and other 
colleagues, i.e. Fulvio Delli Pizzi and Michele Ignelzi, we proposed the homeostasis 
as such a principle. According to its most general definition, homeostasis “regulates 
the global process of breaking away from an original state of rest or balance, and 
of the subsequent restoration of that balance”.17 It seems to be evident that such 
a principle is more general than Leonard B. Meyer’s “implication structure”, as 
well as than Schenker’s “Ursatz”, because both these are tonally and stylistically
16 Ibid., 240.
17 Fulvio Delli Pizzi, Michele Ignelzi, Paolo Rosato, Systems o f Musical Sense. Essays on 
the Analysis, Semiotics, and Hermeneutics o f Music (Helsinki: ISI. 2004), 19.
determined. On the contrary, Kurth’s energetic conception of music is very close 
to our perspective, but I cannot debate here this matter.
Transcendental subject and modalization 
at a deep level (being-in-itself)
In physical terms, “energy” is the result of a “work”, and this latter of 
a “force”. At last, a subject is needed as a bringer of this force. Let us delay the 
question about the substanciality of this subject in the musical field, and let try to 
describe it in terms of modalities.
This musical subject “will” both “be” and “do”. I agree with Tarasti’s distinc­
tion between “to be” and “spaciality” on one side, and “to do” and “temporality” 
on the other, but just for the levels of surface. If we examine a theme in a sonata 
form, we can well identify it with the static moment of “to be”, in opposition to the 
transition and the development which will appear as the dynamical moment of “to 
do”. But in a proper sense, no musical theme can be really static, because music 
is always a form of movement. So, in a deep sense, if a musical subject want “to 
be”, it has necessarily “to do”. In an Heideggerian perspective, we could say that 
musical being is time: in music — almost at this level of analysis — to be is the 
same that to do. We can also refer to Fichte’s principle that esse sequitur operari.
Homeostasis well clarifies the sense of the all aforementioned propositions. 
Musical subject bursts out of the silence, if he want “to be”. But homeostasis says 
also that this musical subject “must” to limitate his own “to do”, if he want to be 
recognizable as such (modality of “know”).
But what does mean that this musical subject “can’? We are here studying 
some processes internal to the musical text (utterance, enunciation), bu t it is not 
easy to separate these processes from those, external to the text, which depend 
on the subjects of the act of enunciation. The composer and the performer “can” 
do that the music sounds. The listener, or the receiver of the enunciatarion, 
needs to “know” something, if he wants to activate musical potentiality: in fact, 
an unqualified listener could not recognize a given set of frequencies as sounds 
or music (see John Blacking’s humanly organized sound, 1974).18 However, if we 
refer to an implied composer, in the sense of Umberto Eco and Eero Tarasti,19 we 
can say that his action objectivated itself within the musical signs of a score — in 
Tarasti term ’s they have already become act-signs in the score —, and that these 
potential-signs can be activated (and they can become also act-signs of the per­
formance) whenever somebody wants, and /or can, and/or knows, and/or must.
18 John Blacking, How Musical is Man? (Seattle & London: University of Washington 
Press, 1974).
19 Tarasti, Signs, 73-4.
The subject we are searching for at this deep level conies before any other kind 
of musical subject within the text: so, he cannot be identified with any certain ut­
terances, and it has not got any modal and/or tonal determinations. Therefore, 
I’m not agree with Tarasti when he says that modalities, as deep-level figures, 
“can be portrayed just like Schenker did with his typical forms of Urlinie and Bass 
Brechung”.20 Urlinie and Bass Brechung are not primary events, but they are 
phenomenical ones, although they pertain to a not superficial level.
We are searching for a transcendental subject who was able to fix the conditions 
of the existence of each individual musical subject within any texts (or musical 
objects) of the western culture.
Homeostasis and metamodalities: 
a Fichtian perspective (being-in-myself)
I have already resorted to the notion of homeostasis in order to explain 
the presence of modalities at the deepest level of music, in particular when I spoke 
of “must” and “know”. I want also to remark that the research of a transcendental 
subject is a bit different from that of the Moi. And then, when Tarasti says that 
“even the Moi possesses its own inner obligation, its “must” — one cannot break 
against the laws of M oi”,21 he his referring to another question, on another level of 
study, that is the research of an individual and real, actual subject. It is not a case 
that Tarasti concludes his previous reasoning by affirming that if somebody breaks 
against the laws of Moi, he “subdues his expression”.22 A transcendental subject 
does not aim to any forms of expression in the meaning of individual and artistic 
expressivity.
Let us examine in a detailed manner the relationships between homeostasis 
and metamodalities. To do this, Fichte offers us very useful tools.
1. Transcendental musical subject posits itself. The Fichtian “Ego posits itself’, 
or “the Ego posits originally its own Being”.23 This is the affirmative moment of 
will and can “to be and to do”. As already said, to be is a consequent of to do (esse 
sequitur operari). Here, the willing subject expresses itself as force, work and 
energy. Sounds are freely generated in not-defined time and space.
2. Transcendental musical subject negates itself by means of a resistance. The 
Fichtian “Ego posits non-Ego” or “a non-Ego is absolutely opposited to the Ego”.24 
This is the moment of negation (or absolute limitation) through which the subject
20 Tarasti, “Existential”, 236.
21 Ibid., 242.
22 Ibid.
23 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, The Science o f Knowledge, trans. Adolph Ernst Kroeger. (Phila­
delphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1868), 72.
24 Ibid., 77.
recognizes itself thanks to the opposition to the alterity. This latter is not at all 
another subject, or an oppositing object, but rather a kind of resistance that the 
subject finds in itself. Although this is a first emergency of an inner obligation, the 
prevalent modality is that of “know’: the subject is in front of its identity. Here, the 
homeostasis — as a concluded process of destroying/restoring equilibrium — does 
clearly appear. Sounds have got a determination in time.
3. “The Ego opposites in the Ego a divisible Non-Ego to a divisible Ego”.25 
This is the moment of “must”, when the subject is internally de-limitated. Sounds 
have got a limitation and also a placement in space. Reciprocal action within the 
sounds of subject articulate the space as an oriented field. See diagram 3, where 
I introduce also some Kantian concepts.
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Diagram 3. Analysis of musical being-in-itself in Fichte’s, Kant’s and Tarasti’s concepts
Some subsidiary reflections
We know that Fichte gives to his three principles a logical order, but not 
a chronological one, because the Ego, which is not a mere “to be”, is itself only by 
means of its activity (‘to do”). Is it the same in music? The answer is absolutely 
yes. In fact, only in principle we can think to some pure sounds, without any rela­
tionships with time and space. Practically, if I produce just a single note with my 
voice, I feel at the same time with and within my body: 1) an effort; 2) a rupture of
25 Ibid., 84.
equilibrium — followed by a restoration when the sound ends; 3) a spatial place­
ment (head, throat, chest). There is not great differences if I play an instrument 
and the sound come in my body from outside, or if I just listen to a sound produced 
by another one.
Note that in my scheme I compare Kant’s categories of relation with all the 
three principles, differently from Fichte (who infers these categories just from the 
third principle).
What I here call homeostasis is a universal, transcendental concept, consequent 
to the human substance (in the Kantian terms). In a different way, when I speak 
of homeostasis in analyzing western music, I think to a specific, certain way to 
convey musical energy (melodic, harmonic, rhythmic, agogic, and so on), that 
is the result of historical and social processes. In this sense, I assume that there 
is also a kind of less universal homeostasis, at the same time transcendental (as 
an a-priori condition of listening to) and historical (a condition limited in space 
and time). We can call the latter H(omeostasis)l, and the former H(omeostasis)0.
An interesting question is if in some practical and cultural conditions, a dis­
tinction between homeostasis and oriented field was never possible. For example, 
a descending melody of random sounds which cannot evoke any oriented fields 
(modal, tonal, serial, dodecaphonic, and so on), at least in their first occurrence.26
However, the fact that homeostasis and oriented field are strictly related, does 
not mean that we cannot distinguish them in our analytical phases. By changing 
some features pertaining to homeostasis and/or to the oriented field, music can 
change its meanings.
At last, we have to remember that here we are studying the metamodalities in 
their most abstract aspects. When analyzing a musical text, we have to consider 
modalities and musical features at very different levels, and we have to take into 
account of their manifold relationships.
From a transcendental to an individual subject
What we have studied until now, pertains to the musical being-in-itself 
in its deepest level. But we can taste immediately some consequents in practical 
analysis.
Let us return to Tarasti’s analysis of Beethoven. As seen above, he says that “in 
bars 1-4 we hear only the pulsating triple rhythm and short motifs (“a”), discussed 
[...] in terms of the “want-to-do” of kinetic energy without stability”.27 Tarasti rec­
ognizes here “the moment of Being-in-myself in all of its immediacy”.28
26 See Firstness in Peiciean sense, in Tarasti, Signs, in particular 10 and 85.
27 Tarasti, “Existential”, 257.
28 Ibid., 246.
Let us see now at the first four bars in our homeostatical perspective. I mean 
here a homeostasis which has been culturally determined, that is HI. Inner and 
external spaces are both stationary on the tonic: we hear only sounds from the E 
flat triad in a fixed register. On the contrary, rhythm and melody are in movement, 
as also Tarasti points out. But pulsating triple rhythm is not yet vectorialized: it 
is tensive just because of the context, that is the beginning of something to be 
discovered. It is not a case that we find a similar situation at the end of this piece 
(from bar 351), this time with a closing function.
Melody shows two contrasting directions in its moving: a descent (a third) in 
the distinctive units (Tarasti’s motivs “a” and “a1”), and an ascent (again a third) 
in the conjunction of these two melodic units. See example 1.
Allegro molto e con brio du2 (a third above) 
d ui '---------------------------1
Example 1
By applying Tarasti’s paradigms of memory and waiting,29 we can ask in which 
way these four bars have to be continued in order to create a homeostatical unit as 
short as possible. Firstly, let us consider the pure melody. We know that a significa­
tive melodic unit needs at least of an opening, a tension, a relaxation, and a closing. 
In our four bars we can find the opening, the tension, and just the beginning of 
the relaxation. See example 2. In fact, the point of rest of our curve is E flat3, and 
it has to been reached yet. So, if we are looking for a melodic stability, we have to 
add a movement towards that note and a closing too.
opening tension apex beginning
29 Tarasti, A Theory o f Musical Semiotics, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1994), 
63-6.
In example 3 1 show a first possibility. Here, I add two distinctive units which 
reproduce the model of udl, and complete the descent from B flat to E flat. I call 
theme V-ud, where “V” means “virtual”, as they do not appear in the real text. In 
this case, V-ud4 is identical to udl, but with an opposite function within the curve. 
Moreover, A flat and F (in V-ud3) need a dominant chord. This way, a tension ap­
pears also in the harmonic level, which occurs in a different moment with respect to 
the melodic one. However, both harmonic and melodic tensions find their discharge 
at the end on the tonic, and what results is an absolutely homeostatical organism.
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Example 3
By applying the gap-fill melody logic, we can observe that the melodic G in 
V-ud4 is superfluous. We can eliminate it and go directly to E flat. This way we can 
obtain also a more metrically standard conclusion, with a long tonic, according 
with a cultural paradigm of memory and waiting. See example 4. 
melodic tension
opening apex relaxation closing
d ul du2 V-du3 V-du4'
harmonic tension
Example 4
Now, we wonder if we can build such a homeostatical organism without any 
references to the dominant chord. To do this, we have simply to erase V-ud3 from
the melodic organism of example 3 (see example 5, line 1), and then to change its 
conclusion like we did in example 4 (see example 5, line 2). The last melodic organ­
ism we have just found seems to satisfy what needed from homeostasis, although 
it was only six bars long.
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Let us compare this six bars with the beginning of the piece. See example 6. 
Beethoven’s real text shows an overlapped new melodic unit at the right hand, while 
the conclusion of the first melodic significative unit occurs at the left hand. Moreover, 
at this hand, disappears the pulsating rhythm, which is continued at the right hand.
All this means, in my opinion, that the first occurrence in the piece is a melodic- 
harmonic unit of six bars. This unit — although not perfectly homeostatic because 
of the lack of the tonic in the lower voice at bar 6 — seems to possess a great degree 
of stability. Rupture of stability depends on the overlapping of a new voice, in an 
upper register (a break in the external space).
Tarasti notices that ud l (motif “a” in his terms) “returns in a way in the discant 
register as the inversion of the melodic-triadic motif of the opening”.30 If we change 
something in example 5, like we do in example 7, we can better understand this 
phenomenon. In fact, the bass line from E flat to G, in bars 5 -6  (see example 7, 
line 2), is the inversion of V-ud4 (G-E flat), before it was transformed in V-ud4”. 
That means that some virtual features of the first occurrence of the piece have 
been conserved although partially hidden. Moreover (see line 2 again) I reduced 
the new melodic unit (motif “b” in Tarasti’s terms) to the basic pulsating triple
30 Tarasti, “Existential”, 258.
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rhythm of the beginning (by wiping out the neighbouring tones). This way, we can 
clearly understand what Tarasti means, when he writes that “the pulsation from 
“a” continues but it is provided with form by the “b” m otif’.31
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31 Ibid.
It seems to be clear that, although in an essential manner, the beginning of this 
piece has got a certain kinetic form, which satisfies the homeostatical principle. If 
we can speak of instability it is because of other elements, like the overlapping of 
the second melodic unit, or the rhythmical transformation of the conclusion of the 
first unit, or the lack of the tonic in the lower voice. That means that the beginning 
of this piece puts us in front of the being-for-myself, not the being-in-myself. If we 
want to investigate on the being-in-myself we have to search in a different way.
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